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Introduction

The WTO is no longer a privileged club of countries, it has transformed into a
global trade system and its rules are not just internal and institutional but represent a
world trade order. Free trade has expanded to many parts of the world, swallowing up
countries that, a decade ago, never could be considered part of a world trade system. One
example is Russia which followed socialistic ideals in the past but is now on the verge of
gaining access to the WTO. Other countries of the former Soviet Union, including
Uzbekistan, are rushing to join the club while others, "lucky" countries like Kyrgyzstan,
have reached the "dream" of being accepted.
At the same, the WTO is not a panacea for developing countries to eliminate
poverty and boost economic development. WTO rules are far from being fair. They carry
the egoistic, national interests of member countries and reflect the classic Ricardo 1 idea:
when everyone is able to follow their own narrow financial interests others pursuing the
same can benefit. Obviously, there are other criticisms and disadvantages, but as yet there
is no alternative to the WTO.
The WTO is currently the most effective tribunal for international dispute
resolution. The International Court of Justice, the United Nations' dispute settlement
mechanism, looks "helpless" compared to the dispute settlement body of the WTO. The
WTO is the first brick in universal globalization; countries are bound by the same rules

1

Richard Ricardo, The Principles ofPolitical Economy and Taxation (1817).
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and part of one mechanism. This explains the tendency toward expanding the WTO to
govern human rights issues, which, in my opinion, is completely wrong and inconsistent
with the pure economic purpose of the WTO.
Under the shining fa�ade of the WTO, numerous remaining controversies
contribute to continuous stagnation of least-developed countries -- especially those whose
main export assets are agriculture products. Agriculture subsidization is the most
sensitive controversy. The disproportionate trade liberalization of industrial and
agriculture products threatens the perspective of economic globalization. The "mystery"
of subsidies is inconsistent with WTO rules and prohibited in the trade of industrial
goods, but remains unresolved in agriculture.
The focus of this research is the economic and legal perception of agriculture
subsidies from an international trade perspective. The four chapters of this thesis cover
the economic and legal issues of agricultural subsidization with concrete examples where
those subsidies are applied.
The first chapter provides general, introductory information about agriculture
subsidies and discusses the economic mechanism of subsidization in agriculture, as well
as other fields of a country's economy. There are three main questions in this chapter:
Why are countries addicted to subsidies? How does this addiction destroy the healthy
structure of a market economy? How does subsidization lead to an oversupply of
agriculture products? This chapter is divided into related subchapters.
The second chapter offers a necessary explanation of the regulation of subsidies
under the GATT/WTO system. This chapter is divided into two subparts that discuss the
regulatory mechanism of the previous GATT and the present WTO. My main goals are to

4

show the gradual progression m the legal understanding of the distorting effects of
agricultural subsidies and explain their classifications.
The third chapter examines developed countries' regulation of subsidies as well as
their approach to reducing and eliminating subsidization. The two key-players in the
WTO, the US and the EU, will be covered in separate subchapters discussing their
agricultural policies, their export and domestic subsidization and their reforms to reduce
or eliminate subsidies.
The final chapter of my thesis focuses on the developing world. My goal is to
analyze the position of developing countries in agricultural trade, with an emphasis on
countries in transition, especially Uzbekistan. In the last subchapter, I will analyze the
agricultural sector of Uzbekistan and provide proposals for agricultural reforms that
could increase agricultural output, without subsidies, while being consistent with WTO
requirements in case Uzbekistan becomes a WTO member nation.
In the conclusion I will attempt to summarize my research.

5

I

Chapter 1: The Economic Nature of Agricultural Subsidies.

Economic and legal theories have different perceptions of subsidies, but this
chapter will focus on the economic view of subsidies. This chapter offers a basic
economic understanding of subsidies and their adverse effect on agricultural production
and the international trade of agricultural products.

1.1) Economic Explanation of Agriculture Subsidies

The different perceptions of subsidies exist because law is the will of countries;
negotiated, approved and obligatory for both sides to the agreement. In contrast,
economic theory reflects the natural self-regulation of the market. In other words, the
economic explanation is proven by the impact on the market while the legal explanation
results from consensus during negotiations. It is clear that most economic ideas and
theories are transformed under the influence of other interests.
A subsidy is financial assistance in the form of direct or indirect payments to
farmers that reimburse expenses or provide additional financial benefits. One definition
states that a subsidy is financial support which "allows the domestic price in exporting
countries to exceed the world price. "2 is the general consensus is that subsidies, as
financial support, lead to a deviation between domestic and world prices.

2

-

See, M.M. Reed International Trade in Agriculture Products, p. 53, 2001.
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Subsidies can exist as direct or indirect payments. Direct payments are often
grants to consumers or farmers which have interest rates that are lower than for producers
engaged in different industries.
Indirect payments, more often called "hidden subsidies," are more solid in the
amount of support and include all forms of support except direct assistance. Cees Van
Beers and Andre de Moor divide indirect subsidies into four categories.3
• Preferential taxation, e.g., tax credits, tax exemptions, tax deduction,
and rate relief
• Provision of goods and services below cost, e.g., complimentary
services, including low and fixed oil and gasoline prices for farmers,
and free - or very cheap - rent of agriculture equipment;
• Capital cost subsidies, e.g., preferential loans, liability guarantees, and
debt forgiveness; and
• Extensive market regulation, e.g., pnce regulation, quantity controls,
and procurement policies.
Often, import and export tariff and non-tariff barriers can serve the function of supporting
domestic agro-producers, but legally they are different than subsidies.4 Hidden support
subsidization creates a more beneficial environment for farmers, shielding them from
market disturbances such as increasing oil prices and unpredictable taxation, while
guaranteeing access to agriculture equipment.
To calculate direct subsidies, officials and economists use a benchmark, which is
different for each type of subsidy, for comparison to actual situation. While this method
looks very simple for calculating hidden subsidies, but the fact that they do not officially
exist in any government budget is problematic. For example, to calculate capital cost

3

Id. at 11.

4

See, C. Beers, A. Moor, Public Subsidies and Policy Failures, p. 5, 2001.
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subsidies, the difference between the market rate for loans or capital investments and the
actual interest rate for governmental loans is multiplied to the amount of governmental
loans. To calculate tax subsidies economists use three methods. 5 The revenue-forgone
method, which measures ex post the amount by which revenues are reduced by a
particular provision; the revenue-gain method, which measures ex ante the expected
increase in revenues were the provision abolished; and the outlay-equivalent method,
which measures the cost of providing the same monetary benefit as the tax expenditure
through direct spending.
This calculation may provide necessary information about the intensity of
agriculture subsidization in different countries. Further, this calculation is necessary to
measure the impact of agriculture subsidization, which will be covered primarily in the
following chapter.

1.2) Harmful Impact of Subsidies

Many countries spend a huge amount of money on the subsidization of agriculture
producers. 6 I cannot say that all subsidies that support domestic agriculture producers are
an unreasonable waste of money; sometimes they can play a good role.
On one hand, subsidies can equalize the economic development of a country. For
example, profitability in the agriculture business depends on varying conditions such as
weather and pesticides. The weather can be very unpredictable, early spring can be
5

Ibid, p.30

OECD countries spend about $400 billion annually on agriculture subsidization. Other sectors like energy
and industry are also heavily subsidized($ 240 billion).(C.v. Beer, A. de Moore, p. 31).
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delayed by cold snowstorms and the blooming of fruit trees or growing process of cotton
can be delayed because of emergency weather conditions. On the other hand, if the
weather is very good for a harvest, there will be a surplus in agricultural products'
supply. The profitability of specific agriculture products can vary because the agriculture
business is risky and unpredictable. In contrast, industrial production depends only on
consumer choice and habits, which is why industrial production is less risky and more
profitable. Countries try to redirect money from industry to agriculture by charging high
taxes on industrial producers' extra profits and, directly or indirectly, contributing to less
profitable agriculture producers. This seems like the socialist, Marxist idea that all sectors
of an economy need to have comparatively equal earnings.
Further, everything linked to food supply is very sensitive. Countries are reluctant
to rely on foreign agro-suppliers because the agriculture business is so unpredictable;
foreign producers could fail to meet the terms of a food supply agreement because of
weather conditions. Consequently, countries choose to produce a surplus of agro-products
rather than face even a small risk of starvation. Every developed and developing country
that subsidizes agriculture producers is aware of the related expenses, but food security,
like any security interest, takes priority.
These "socialistic" concerns for the farming industry and food security are two
main arguments for continuing subsidization worldwide. However, these are very similar
to the historic mercantilist arguments against free trade (analyzed in detail later). Also,
policies of mandatory governmental subsidization create inefficiency and are inconsistent
with natural market rules. The economic experience of the USSR shows that state

9

intervention in market relations eliminates competition. In this case, the agriculture
industry works to favor state interests, not consumer choice and habit.
The market mechanism, especially in agriculture, is very fragile. When a country
uses subsidies it must continue to increase the level and amount of subsidies. To illustrate
this point, consider subsidized farmers that receive a fixed price that is higher than the
market level; since their profits are higher, it is logical they will increase their output.
Sooner or later, a heavy surplus of agriculture products will be created, meaning that state
officials will have to subsidize, i.e. pay for, the transportation and storage of these
products. In every annual cycle, the surplus will increase and having a tremendous effect
on the decreasing market price. Farmers' profits will again decrease and the government
will again have to spend billions of dollars to reimburse the losses. The worst thing is that
logically this on-budget and off-budget expense will increase. Further, it will raise the tax
burden of industrial corporations, which flourish without external support. Higher taxes
are never favorable for industrial companies; to the contrary, they create a hostile
environment for further development of businesses in a country's industrial sector. 7
The consumer and industrial sectors carry the burden of subsidy support for
agriculture. Consumers are forced to spend more money on food than on clothing or other
basic needs. Without complicated economic calculations it is possible to see that prices
for food in Germany are much higher than in the US. It is possible that the higher levels
of agriculture subsidization raise the burden on consumers. It is understandable that

7

Neither subsidization is effective nor is it reasonable: The OECD calculates that every $5 of support
generates $1 of income, as a result $4 are wasted. (Ibid, 36).

national budgets can not carry the massive subsidy expenses, and government officials
divide the burden by redirecting it to consumers.
These subsidy practices are also inconsistent with the economic idea of
comparative advantage8 which is the main ideology and backbone of the GATT/WTO
and free trade. Let me briefly explain how this theory works in the case of agriculture.
This idea logically continued Adam Smith's idea of absolute advantage. 9 In the
theory of absolute advantage, Smith assumed that if one country, for example the US, has
an absolute advantage in producing bread another country, France, has the advantage in
producing wine when same inputs: land, labor, capital are compared. Using all resources
the US can produce 120 units of bread and 40 units of bread can be produced in France.
Using all of its resources France can produce 40 units of wine but the US can only
produce 30. In this case, it is clear that the US has the absolute advantage in bread and
France has the advantage in wine. Consequently, specializing in the commodity in which
a country has absolute advantage is more profitable than combining both bread and wine.
If the hypothetical were changed so that the US produces more bread (120 units)
and wine (30 units) than France, which can only produce 40 units of bread and 20 units of
wine, using all its resources, it is better to produce only bread and import wine from
France and vice versa, despite the fact that the US is better at producing both
commodities. The reason is that the US needs to spend resources for producing four units
of bread to produce one unit of wine. Conversely, France needs the same resources to
produce one unit of wine as for two units of bread. We can see that France has the

8

9

See Ricardo, supra note 1, passim.

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) passim.
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comparative advantage over the US in producing wine. Even though producing wine will
cost two units of bread in France, in the US this cost will be four units, meaning that wine
will be more costly to produce than in France. The US has the same comparative
advantage in producing bread. If there is no trade between the US and France, the price of
wine in the US will be four times more than price of bread and in France two times the
price of bread. Suppose that the wine costs $1 in the US, bread will be twenty-five cents.
In France wine will be $1 but bread will be fifty cents. If trade between the US and
France occurs, the US will choose to produce bread and France will choose to produce
wine, because both have the comparative advantage in producing an exact good. Despite
the fact that the US has the absolute advantage in both products, it is still more profitable
for the US to concentrate on producing only the commodity where the US has the
comparative advantage. Comparative advantage interests rule over absolute advantage
interests. Ricardo's simple and genius theory crushed the remaining arguments of
mercantilists who agitated for producing most goods in the US, favoring fewer imports
rather than more exports in order to dominate the world.
The inconsistency between subsidies and comparative advantage is that
comparative advantage is not used in the world trade of agriculture products. The
developed world has left developing countries with only one option - develop only the
industrial sector, where the developed world already has the comparative technological
advantage. The EU and the US waste huge amounts of money subsidizing 10 the
production of luxury-class industrial goods in order to keep their dominant position in the

10

It has already been proven that it is less effective to support the production of goods where a country
does not have the comparative advantage.
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sector11 while promoting higher protection and enforcement in the WTO for their own
intellectual property, especially against developing countries. Not only is this an "unfair"
choice but it is also straight discrimination against agricultural trade in developing world.
In addition, various threats to the environment are inherent in subsidization
because this policy leads to over-use of natural resources in agriculture. While
environmental issues are very important, they are not covered in detail because it is a
very complex issue and outside the scope of my research where I intend to focus on the
distorting effects of agricultural subsidies on international trade.

1.3) Barriers to Reforms to Eliminate Subsidies

As previously explained, there is no economic purpose for subsidization. The
reader could ask if subsidization is so bad for economic interests and inconsistent with
the idea of free trade and the rules of the WTO, then why does it remain and why was it
exempt until January 1, 2004? The answer is that there are economic and political
barriers, which highlight the sensitivity of this issue to radical reforms.
One of the two main economic barriers is rent seeking behavior. This is caused by
an addiction to subsidies. The farmer who receives subsidies will seek to maximize
profits and raise the level of subsidies in the following cycle. The simple way to do so is
to invest more in land and fertilizers, because more land and fertilizer leads to more
output in agriculture production with guaranteed purchase at a minimum fixed price. This
11

In this category I include all highly priced goods that require huge total investments (subsidies),
.
_
sustained by developed countries to provide scientific research - an opporturuty the developmg world
lacks.
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behavior creates inefficiency in production and consumption and boosts new cycles of
subsidies.
For example, in the Soviet Union during the 1970-90's, wheat production was
heavily subsidized. The more farmers produced, the more income they would receive.
Consequently, the level of production and the associated subsidies increased every cycle.
Due to the permanently increasing supply of wheat, the price of bread fell significantly
and the government had to subsidize the state trading network by reimbursing the losses
incurred from selling cheap bread. The real price of bread, not only the real costs of
production but also the transport, selling, storage expenses, etc, was lower. The price of
bread was not as low as it should have been and a lot of bread was not sold. The surplus
returned to agriculture producers to be used as the main meal for "happy pigs" on pig
farms. At the same time banners on the street declared that we should value bread, large
amounts of bread were wasted because of the system of subsidization. 12
This "perverted" and inefficient behavior created the second economic barrier:
adjustment costs. These costs are necessary for providing reforms to eliminate
subsidization. Subsidies that exist only in the form of direct financial aid are much easier
to eliminate than other forms. When subsidies are linked to production output, including
gigantic investments in land, fertilizers, pesticides, etc., their elimination means high
additional costs because the expenses suddenly become useless. It is easier to redirect the
labor force ' farmers ' to the industrial or services sectors of the economy rather than meet
the impossible goal of saving a billion investments in big fertilizer-producing plants or

12

I do not mention the ecological catastrophe of the Aral Sea crisis which was caused by inefficient
consumption of water resources.
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previously high-priced agriculture lands. The reforms guarantee the depletion of the so
called agricultural surplus caused by multi-cycled, long-term subsidization. This fear of
painful reform s in agriculture subsidization is the main obstacle to the necessary reforms.
In Public Subsidies and Policy Failures C. van Beers and A. de Moore [correct source?
Cite pages] associate the need for subsidies with drug addiction. Whether or not the

reforms can be compared to the rehabilitation of drug users, there is no example of an
addicted person being cured without pain and suffering.
There are strong lobbies in key countries like the US, the EU, and Japan, and
future prices in the agriculture market are difficult to predict. All attempts to implement a
market regulation mechanism in agriculture trade are risky. Moreover, it is certain that
after reforms, previously subsidized farmers will suffer huge economic losses, but as with
any addiction, it is very easy to begin but very hard and painful to stop.

15

Chapter 2: Legal Nature of Agricultural Subsidies Under GATT/WTO.

This chapter is divided into two subchapters. The first section discusses the
history and development of the most controversial, sensitive and "scandalous" topic subsidies in agriculture. This history is necessary to understand further changes and
advances in reforming the regulatory mechanism of agriculture subsidization under the
present WTO.
The second describes and analyzes the modem regulatory mechanism under the
present WTO. This subchapter concentrates both on export agricultural subsidies and
domestic support subsidies. They are different in name but very similar in their ability to
distort the international trade of agricultural products.

2.1) Regulatory Mechanism Under the Previous GATT System

2.1.1) A Historical Overview of the Legal Development of Export Subsidies Regulation
Under ITO-GATT

The WTO is an organization with a history that is the most unique of any
international organization. The modem WTO, in my opinion, is the restoration of the
ITO- International Trade Organization. The ITO was created as a universal organization,
like the United Nations (UN), in the sphere of trade and was a symbol of revolutionary
globalization. [cite] Aimed at promoting free trade in the world, the ITO needed to be a
part of the UN system. Reasonably, one question can come to mind, "Why wasn't the

16

charter of the ITO accepted by countries, what was the Achilles heel of this
organization?"
One of the reasons was banal - export subsidies. From the mid-1940' s, subsidies
were within the scope of interest of post-war countries and a legal framework to regulate
them was needed. The 1940 US-proposed charter of the ITO made a difference in
shaping a special regime for each type of subsidy. Subsidization of exports was subject to
notification and consultation.[cite] By prohibiting export subsidies the US created a safe
harbor for subsidies when chronic oversupply occurred. Consequently, all US farm
subsidies at that time were exempted from the new regulation. [cite] Some countries
opposed the US view of subsidies because they did not see a clear distinction between
export subsidies and domestic subsidies, since both can result in oversupply and can be
barriers for other countries' exports. Others were against the privileged position of
primary products requiring exceptional treatment. Developing countries believed it was
discriminatory because of the special treatment afforded the subsidization of main
agriculture products in which developing countries had the comparative advantage.
Subsidization would be legalized but, at the same time, prohibited where the developed
world had a better return. [cite] Later negotiations led to a tightening of the export
subsidies discipline in the charter of the ITO. The one thing that effected American
support of the agreement was the export subsidy provisions, which pushed the US to
propose additional agreements as a "temporary document narrowly aimed at slashing
tariffs." 13

13

Raj Bhala. International Law: Theory and Practice. (Mathew Bender & Co, Inc, Danvers Mass. 2000).
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This document was GATT, which moved from a supplemental and temporary
document to a permanent and main agreement that created the foundation for the
Uruguay Round that established the WTO. This alternative agreement, and the influence
of the American administration, completely negated plans to form the ITO; the minimum
number of countries did not ratify the ITO agreement. Through ambitious plans, the
subsidies discipline shrunk to just one paragraph in Article XVI: 1 where all subsidies
were governed by the same rules, regardless of the product, industrial or primary, to
which they applied. Further, there was not any differentiation between export and
domestic subsidies because the law only generally addressed the regime of subsidies.
In his International Trade class, Professor Fidler gives various examples where
the language of the GATT articles does not strictly prohibit anything, including any form
or class of subsidies. 14 The agreement

15

looks more like a compromise between

countries, a too careful first step on the way to trade liberalization. This weak regulation
obliged countries to "discuss" with other parties the possibility of limiting subsidies if
they caused or threatened serious prejudice to their respective interests. The non
obligatory sense of GATT led to an amendment in 1995 which added four new
paragraphs to Article XVI, primarily covering export subsidization. The first provision
gives an explicit explanation of subsidies and their distorting effect. 16 This was the first
attempt to give a basic definition to export subsidies and thus pushed countries to secure
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vanous forms of export subsidies, including direct subsidies and the remission or
exemption of charges or taxes on condition of exportation, by exempting existing
subsidies in a non-exhaustive list of practices. The parties were still not ready to define
subsidies in a way that accurately reflected how they exist. The word may allows for the
chance that subsidies do not always have distorting effects where "export subsidies are
granted with the aim of affecting trade. If export subsidies do not distort trade, it is
simply because they have not been effective." 17 Rationally, I can compare subsidies to
dumping practices. The main difference is that dumping, where the price of one country's
goods in a foreign market are lower than the cost of domestic production or price, is
usually committed by private businesses and is strictly prohibited and punished.
Subsidies, on the other hand, are the same action taken by governments and are protected
from the injurious dumping definition and related remedies.
In 1955, the addition of two substantive paragraphs provided the distinction
between the subsidization of primary apd non primary products. Concerning primary
products, it was stated that "contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies
in primary products." 18 Also, it was allowed to apply subsidies if they did not exceed "an
equitable share of world export trade . . . the shares of the contracting parties in the
product during a previous representative period" 19 In other words, it is permissible to

opean Lawyers Perspective, (Kluwer
G. Deapayre, R. Ptriccione Subsidies in International Trade: A Eur
1991) p. 73.
17

18
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Section B, Article XVI of GATT.
Id.

19

20
subsidize exports using "dual pricing" in an amount not more than an "equitable trade

share."
This term, equitable trade share, was later criticized by the Leutwiler Report as
"economically misconceived, since it implicitly endorses market-sharing. It is also too
vague and subjective to permit clear judgment on whether a subsidy is acceptable or not .
. . A better test of legitimacy than that of equitable share is needed for subsidies on
primary products."

21

The lack of a clear test caused a lot of questions and gave more legal

space for maneuvering by developed countries. This term was first used in 1958, in the
French Wheat case22 where Australia complained that the subsidization of wheat and
wheat flour exports was inconsistent with provisions of Article XVI:3. The panel stated
that equitable share applies to the share in world export trade of a particular product and
not to trade in that product in an individual market. In other words, the overall trade of a
particular product in the whole market of countries to which exporter exports must be
considered, rather than the individual markets of a country. Furthermore, the panel
decided that based on the figures and facts that wheat exports had increased substantially,
exceeding the clearly established quantities previously exported, it was a recognized fact
that the equitable share had also increased. Since there an exact statistical definition for
equitable share was lacking this test was accepted by the panel. This is not a well-defined
test, but it still sheds light on the basic interpretation of equitable share.
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Even if equitable share were used with the word "shall" it would be weakened by
the "seek to avoid'' but instead the weaker term "should'' was used. Overall, this
obligation seems to be very soft in legal terms. Traditionally, there was the official
statement that countries shall make an agreement to abolish all remaining subsidies
23
before the end of 1957. From January 1958 any subsidy on non-primary products that

had the effect of reducing the export price comparatively to the domestic one was
banned. Later, this provision was diminished because the period from 1955-58 was not
enough to eliminate those subsidies.
As a result, I can see the pure discriminatory nature of export subsidies'
regulations. As the mam exporters of primary goods, developing countries took
obligations with regard to non-primary goods while developed countries were sanctioned
to continue on the legal basis of subsidizing their own export of primary goods. While
playing an "unfair" game in the area of primary goods, the developed world obliged
developing world to play a "fair" game in the area of non-primary goods where they, the
developed world, have a main interest.
Generally, the 1955 amendment did nothing but breathe new life into the dead
two-level ITO classifications of export subsidies and domestic products and the ITO
distinction between primary and non-primary products. Before 1955, subsidies and their
distorting nature were recognized but there was not a sufficient obligatory regime to
enforce countries to reduce subsidies. Ambiguous plans to limit subsidization were not
successful; instead they increased tensions between the developed and developing

23

Ad Article XVI, paragraph 4.
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worlds. Neither the Dilon Round (1960-61) nor the Kennedy Round (1964-67) had any
recognizable success during negotiations.
During the Tokyo Round (1973-79) a first, important tiny step towards
recognizing non-tariff problems in international trade was taken. During negotiations,
parties were successful on the non-tariff issues. During this round the non-tariff barriers
(NTB) to trade caught the attention of parties, but the major success was concentrated in
the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
GATT, known as the "Subsidies Code." The most controversial issues in the Subsidies
Code negotiations were "the problem of domestic . . . subsidies and subsidies of
agriculture exports."24 The Subsidies Code shows progress among members towards
understanding the necessity of applying reforms to the trade of agriculture products.
Briefly, there were differences and common points between previous ITO/GATT
regulations and the Subsidies Code of the Tokyo Round25 :
•
•
•
•

The Subsidies Code was plurilateral, not multilateral like the previous agreement.
Endorsable only in signatory countries (25), it existed as a parallel regulation to
the previous GATT;
Both regulations failed to give a clear and full definition for subsidies;
Other subsidies, except those on exports, were not prohibited. Moreover, they
were legally approved. 26
While the 1955 amendment's definition of "primary products" was divided into
"certain primary products" and "other products," the more narrow definition
included agriculture in only the first division.27

J. Burton and B. Fisher, International Trade and Investments (Little Brown & Co., Boston 1986) p.351.
25
See Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General
Agreement ('Tokyo Round Subsidies Code'), Article 10, 1980, BISD 26S/56.
24
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•
•

A new concept, "price-undercutting" in Article 10:3 of the Subsidies Code
prohibited subsidies resulting in prices below those of other suppliers to the sam�
market.
The Subsidies Code advanced the following points:
• The level of prohibition of export subsidization was more equalized and
flat in general.
• Exceptions to the rules prohibiting export subsidies were narrowed to
agriculture products only.
In general, the agreement existed as a parallel code and obligated only the

signatory countries. The limited number of signatories weakened the practical importance
of the code. It caused double standards among countries, when signatories had to use its
rules while those who did not sign could just follow the previous GATT regulation. There
is no doubt the Tokyo Round's Subsidies Code was evolutionally a major step toward
building a more effective regulatory scheme under a modem WTO regime. It was stated
in the Punta del Esta Declaration that negotiations on subsidies and countervailing
measures was "based on a review of Articles VI and XVI and the MTN Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing measures with the objective of improving GATT
disciplines relating to all subsidies and countervailing measures that affect international
trade." 28

2.2) Regulatory Mechanism Under WTO

This subchapter analyses two agreements, the first regulating export subsidies in
general, and the second covering only the agricultural area.

d_ in Punta del Este, Uruguay,
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2.2.1) Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measu
res:
Definition and Classification ofExport Subsidies
The Tokyo Round Agreement did not change the situation with subsidization,
especially in the agriculture sector. There was tight competition on the level of
agriculture subsidization among the US, the EU, Japan and other key players in the world
market. Developing countries were still in the disadvantaged position where they could
not afford the high cost of subsidizing their own farmers and were losing export
possibilities in agricultural trade.
During the Uruguay Round negotiations (1994) the situation changed suddenly; a
subsidies "treaty;" the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, was
concluded. Compared to the old Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, there were significant
improvements in the new agreement, which:
•

Defined for the first time, in any GATT agreement, certain key terms, such as
"subsidy" and "serious prejudice;"

•

Prohibited export subsidies and subsidies contingent on the use of domestic
instead of imported goods, including de facto export subsidies that are tied to
exports or export earnings in practice though not in law;

•

Created a special presumption of serious prejudice for certain egregious subsidies;

•

Defined and significantly strengthened the procedures for showing when serious
prejudice exists in foreign markets;

•

Established a category of government assistance that will be non-actionable and
non-countervailable only when strict conditions and criteria are satisfied;

•

Required all developing countries, other tha� _the least develo�ed, to phase out
export subsidies and import substitution subs1d1es_; and acceleratmg t�e phase-out
of export subsidies in situations where a developmg country has achieved global
export competitiveness in a particular product sector; and

24

•

Applied the rapid, effective WTO dispute settlement mechanism which will end
the present ability of the losing, subsidizing government to block the adoption of
panel reports. 29
Before the Uruguay Round there were not effective, reasonable devices limiting

subsidization in agriculture. As a result, there were not any signs of reducing
subsidization, and the increase in subsidizations was tremendous. An OECD study
covering the period from Tokyo Round (1979) to the Uruguay Round (1986), discovered
that the stable increase in subsidizatoin reached $98 billion. 30 Many developing countries
that could not survive the competition in subsidization sustained huge losses in the export
of agriculture products. This led to a new wave of agriculture disputes among countries;
according to OECD data there were "82 disputes in the period of 1980-1990 and 60
percent concerned agriculture. " 31 This is why the issue of ineffective dispute settlement
mechanisms in agricultural disputes demanded the necessity for a new round of
negotiations inside the WTO. The dangerous dissatisfaction among parties led to hot
debates from 1980-86, which led to the Ministerial Declaration in Punta del Este
indicating that there is a strong need in "improving the competitive environment by
increasing discipline on the use of all direct and indirect subsidies and other measures
affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade, including the phased reduction of their

29

Raj Bhala p. 969-70.

$163 billion in 1993. OECD, se� J.
After the Uruguay Round the subsidization expenses reached
Legal Perspective,
McMahon, Agriculture Trade, Protectionism and Problems of Development: A
(Leicester University Press, London 1992) p. 7.
31
of the Agreement on Agriculture in the OECD
OECD, The Uruguay Round: A Preliminary Evaluation
Countries (Paris 1995) n. 3 p. 10.
30
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negative effects and dealing with their causes . . . to bring more predictability to world
agriculture trade."32
The definition of subsidy under the Subsidies Agreement requires two elemen
ts:
financial contribution by a government or any public body within a government's
jurisdiction and the transfer of any specific benefit. The Agreement understands financial
contributions to be: direct transactions of supporting funds or potential direct transactions
of those funds and liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); preferential tax regimes such as tax
credits, government supply of necessary goods and services such as free gas and free rent
on mechanical agricultural equipment for farmers; and government procurement of
produced agricultural products.
The Agreement also establishes the classes or "colorization" of subsidies. These
classes are known as prohibited (Red), actionable (Amber) and non-actionable (Green)
subsidies. This "trichotomous"33 classification was previously introduced by the US
during the Tokyo Round but was not accepted.
Red includes two forms of subsidies: export subsidies and subsidies caused and
34
designed for import substitution known as "import substitution subsidies." "In that case

the only thing needed to approve getting remedies is that subsidies exist. There is no need
35
to demonstrate that subsidies have an adverse trade effect. " There are usually two

features with which to identify the "redness" of subsidies; they are solely or partially a
G ATT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round adopted in Punta del Esta, Uruguay, on 20
Septemb:r 1986 reproduced in GATT Focus Newsletter, No 41, (October 1986) p. 4.
33
A "traffic light" approach used for colorization of subsidies. See J. Croome, Reshaping the World
Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round (Geneva 1995).
32

34
35

Article 3 .1 of the SCM Agreement.

Raj Bahala International Trade Law: Theory and Practice (Lexis, 200l) P· 972.
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factor of export performance and partially or completely force the usage of domestically
produced goods instead of imports. These two features have the effect of causing
discriminatory conditions in worldwide competition.
Amber or actionable subsidies include those which may be challenged in court.
The actionability is defined by the adverse effect of subsidization. There are "two types
of norms . . . [ t]he first aims at prohibiting a behavior, the second aims at prohibiting
behavior if it produces certain undesirable effects."36The first type of norm can be
recognized as a Red subsidy regulation, the second, more complex, is an Amber
regulation. Subsidies can be challenged in the dispute settlement body of the WTO if they
have a substantial adverse effect. The country challenging another country for subsidies
must prove the adverse effect. Amber subsidies are limited to those not listed as Red,
meaning not prohibited directly by the Schedule of Subsidies Annex 1 and not included
in the Green class of subsidies. The "adverse effect" concept covers situations where
there is injury to the domestic industry of another member; where the nullification or
impairment of benefits is caused directly or indirectly to another member; and where
serious prejudice to the interests of another member.37 This covers most "domestic
subsidies" that can be granted if no country suffers. These subsidies include agricultural
subsidies, which were subject to the Agreement on Agriculture with some exceptions
until December 31, 2003.

36

See Marc Beniath, The Law of Subsidies Under GATTIWTO System ( Kluwer Law Int., London, 2001) p.

11.
37

Article S(a)-(c) of the SCM agreement. These concepts used in the Uruguay Round SCM agreement are
very similar to those used in GATT 1994.
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Green subsidies are subsidies with minimal impact on international trade. This
class of subsidies is privileged with immunity from dispute settlement litigation in the
WTO. This class carries a non-specific scope of support. Subsidies not created as special
support for a specific industry are categorized as green. However, this obligation does not
automatically expand to all actionable subsidies, and even non-specific subsidies can be
non-actionable. There can be situations covered in paragraph 2 of Article 8 where
subsidies may cause adverse harmful effects on another member's industry.38 If those
effects are "serious" and "such as to cause damage which would be difficult to repair,"
the injured member can seek remedies under Article 9 by requesting consultations with
the subsidizing country. 39
To protect itself, a member has the right to apply countervailing measures which
are "a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed,
directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or exports of any merchandise."40
In some sense, it is revenge: a country can equalize its losses with additional tariffs or
remedies. Countervailing actions can be used to counteract Red and Amber subsidies.
With regard to agricultural subsidization there is a rule that countervailing measures can
be imposed only in accordance with the provision of the Subsidies Agreement and the
Agriculture Agreement. When I discuss the Agriculture Agreement in detail it will be
clear there is exceptional treatment for agricultural subsidization in the WTO.

Apr. 15, 1994, art. 8-2WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
39 See
Article 9 .1 of the SCM agreement.
40
under footnote 36 of the SCM
See Article VI:3 of GATT 1994, and this definition was reproduced

38

agreement.
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2.2.2) Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture

The Agreement on Agriculture of the Uruguay Round, the only unpretentious
document in the history of GATT/WTO, is intended to "establish the basis for initiating a
process of reform of trade in agriculture."41 The liberalization of trade in the agriculture
sector has historically been the most problematic issue, and subsidization is at the center
of the most paradoxical controversy in the WTO since the mid-1940's. There were
various suggestions for subsidies in agricultural trade starting from the maximalist "total
elimination of export subsidies as they produce many of the major distortions in world
agriculture markets"42 to the minimalist complaint of the EU that this is not an
appropriate time to leave this issue to the kindness of market rules. The US was
somewhere in the middle, proposing full elimination of agriculture subsidies over 10
years. The EU request for the chance to re-equalize subsidization, reducing the intensity
of support to highly subsidized products while serving as a hidden credit for less
subsidized products, resulted in neither decreasing the level of subsidization of products
in general nor proposing something reasonable. The EU tried to be misleading by
creating alternative proposals that had zero effect on subsidy reduction.

41

See Preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture, paragraph 1.

42

Luetwiler Report. For details, see M.G.Desta, supra note 20, at 20?.
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a) Export Subsidies in Agriculture

The Agriculture Agreement defined two major subsidies as export and domestic
support. 43 While export subsidies were not directly defined, the definition in the
Subsidies Agreement (hereinafter SCM)44 is the same as the Agriculture Agreement. In
my opinion, member countries tried to avoid duplication and other possible variations by
omitting the definition of export subsidies from the Agriculture Agreement because it
already existed in the SCM. On the other hand, the Agricultural Agreement's superior
position requires using the SCM. Without a clear explanation, the Agreement on
Agriculture left more questions than it answered. There was precedent that clearly
established the answer to the issue of export definition, but the panel decided that the
"SCM agreement as a part of the general context"45 will shed light as a necessary
commentary to the Agricultural Agreement.
There are several examples of various subsidy practices previously recognized by
the SCM and further re-affirmed by the Agreement on Agriculture as export
subsidization. First, direct subsidies or any financial contributions to domestic producers
which are subject to export performance are deemed to be an export subsidy under
Article 9. l(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture. This is almost the same approach as
taken in the SCM for identifying direct subsidies. However, there is a little difference, 9.1
(a) is more narrow and does not cover as much as the SCM.

4

3

44

Agreement on Agriculture ('Agreement on Agriculture'), in FINAL ACT, Annex IA, at 43 (!994)See supra at 27.
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The clear example of "dumping" of agricultural products and identification as
such as an export subsidy was stated in Article 9.l(a).46 At the same time, this provision
is very similar to the SCM "more favorable conditions." This is one argument supportive
for the similarity in the definition of export subsidies in the SCM agreement and the
Agreement on Agriculture.
Any payment on the agricultural export, without regard to the source of payments
or type of agriculture products, are considered to be subsidies under Article 9.1(b). This
provision is very close to the sense of Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM, but more concentrated
on agricultural issues. The second part accentuated the attention of government
involvement in agriculture subsidization and strictly suppresses government efforts to
camouflage subsidization. Article (a) (1) (iv) of the SCM covers the same issues when a
government uses private bodies and provides support from its account.
Specific subsidies for marketing and transportation costs are defined as an export
subsidy in Article 9.l(d). Again, the Agreement on Agriculture is more concentrated on
agricultural practices, the subsidization of farmers' marketing costs assumes the "direct
transfer of funds" explicitly covered by Article 1.l(a)(l)(ii) of the SCM.
"Upstream Subsidies" are subsidies not directed at the whole agricultural product
like wheat, but specifically for products from which the product was processed and partly
used for processing. For example, Uzbekistan will not subsidize flour production but it
will subsidize wheat. As we know, flour is usually produced from wheat and it will be
assumed that the export of flour will be subsidized too. Article 9.1 (f) of the Agreement
of n�n
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deals with those issues more specifically and these days, with an increasing share of
processed food in the agricultural products market, this provision excludes the possibility
of hidden subsidization of agricultural exports.
Clear interference with the SCM provisions is only found in Article 10.2 of the
Agreement, regarding Export Credit Guarantees and Insurance Programs. The Illustrative
List of Export Subsidies defined these practices as export subsidization but the
Agreement on Agriculture offers only humble advice to "undertake to work toward the
development of internationally agreed disciplines to govern the provision of export
credits, export credits guarantees or insurance programs only in conformity therewith."
Stated differently, member countries postponed the more concrete regulation of these
issues for the future, maybe for future generations, and only obligated themselves to obey
future regulations. This provision sheds light on the possible reasons why a different
agreement concerning agricultural subsidies was adopted and more authority over the
issues of agricultural support was assigned to the Agreement on Agriculture instead of
the previously adopted SCM.
Subsidies listed in Article 9.1 are subject to further reduction and those not listed
are flatly prohibited. The listed subsidies are limited to use in conjunction with 22
scheduled agriculture products, including "wheat and wheat flour, coarse grains, rice,
oilseeds, vegetable oils, oilcakes, sugar, butter and butter oil, skim milk, powder, cheese,
other milk products, bovine, meat, pig meat, poultry meat, sheep meat, live animals, eggs,
wine, fruit, vegetables, tobacco, and cotton."47 These limitations and reduction
obligations are not directed at less-developed countries. A base period within which new
47

See M. G. Desta, supra note 20, at 235.
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subsidies could not be introduced was established. This reflects the fundamental idea of
the Uruguay Round of preventing new subsidies as well as the extension of old practices.
Article 3 .3 covers listed subsidies and prohibits applying those subsidies to non
scheduled agriculture products. On the other side, the anti-circumvention provision of
Article 10, covers non-listed subsidies to the products in the scope of the schedule. This
paradox, or the whole Agreement, allows any country to apply any subsidy, other than
those listed in Article 9 .1, to any product, except those scheduled for further reduction,
under the legal principle "whatever is not prohibited is permitted. "48 An injured country
may use Article 3. I of the SCM, which prohibits all forms of export subsidies except
those listed in the Agriculture Agreement. Further, there is the requirement of
Agricultural Agreement Article 8 "not to provide export subsidies otherwise than in
conformity with this agreement" but there is no clear test of conformity provided to
support and more precisely explain the conformity requirement.
It is also important not to overlook the reduction obligations expressed in the
Agreement on Agriculture. The reduction obligations officially named as commitments,
are presented in two forms - budgetary and quantitative, and the reduction must be
performed annually. Each country has to set a schedule of reductions in multilateral or,
more preferred, bilateral negotiations. The Agreement on Agriculture only endowed the
general legal framework in the form of a temporary, transitional document titled
Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform

48

Id. p. 238.
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Program. 49 This document aims complete draft schedules of reduction commitments
during the negotiations, as well as to ease corroboration and officially set up the adopted
schedules as additional provisions to the Uruguay Round Protocol. The Agreement also
50

seeks to

:

1. Define the base period from which to calculate the reduction·
2. Establish the least level of quantitative and expenditure allowances necessary for
each country at the end of an implementation period;
3. Necessitate budgetary and quantitative reductions obligation of each country
annually during the implementation period; and
4.

Leave some space for country to maneuver in adjusting to annual fluctuations of
the quantity and price of agricultural products.
While the limits on subsidization were being negotiated, the US and the EU

increased the level of subsidization in quantitative and budgetary terms and, moreover,
influenced other countries to include a "front loading" provision. 5' This provision was in
the interest of countries like the US and the EU that significantly increased export
subsidies during the 1986-90 base period. After the expiration of this period, these
countries could start actual reductions, not on the higher post-1990 level, but on the base
period level, and annually measure starting from the 1991-92 base period. The countries
that did not raise the subsidization level had to reduce the amount of subsidies more than
countries that rapidly increased the subsidization of exports during the negotiation period.
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The agriculture market can be quite vulnerable. The fluctuations of price can
create an emergency situation where a country has to increase the level of subsidization.
Article 9.2(b)(i) is an exception to the strict commitment to reducing subsidization and
allows for intensifying subsidization in credit to future reduction quotas. Later, when the
situation stabilizes, the country must add the increased amounts to the following base
period percentage of the reduction commitments. If a country does not need to subsidize
at a level defined by the present base period commitments when the market situation is
such that farmers do not need any support, it can save the unused portion of permitted
subsidies for future black days when agriculture prices fall catastrophically. 52 The main
idea behind this exception is to allow countries to correct for unforeseen price
fluctuations but not exempt them from obligations for the entire period of
implementation. Rationally, the exception period cannot be expanded to the overall
implementation period. If a country has a major, long-term problem adjusting agriculture
to new, unsupportive conditions this exception is not a solution, it is not a waiver of
reduction commitments in general.

b) Domestic Support Subsidies in Agriculture

The Uruguay Round negotiations implemented a new regime regulating
international agricultural trade covering such important issues as market access, export
subsidies, domestic support and health legislation. The Punta del Esta Declaration set up
ambitious goals aimed at accomplishing agricultural trade liberalization by
52

See more, M.G. Desta, supra note 20, at 268.
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[I]�provi�g marke� access inter alia, the reduction of import
_ .
b�rr�er�; (u) 1mprovmg the competitive environment by increasing
d1sc1plme on the use of all direct and indirect subsidies and other
measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade ... and
(iii) mi?imizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary
_
regulat10ns and barriers can have on trade in agriculture53
To achieve these goals in the Agreement on Agriculture, legislators made two categorie
export subsidies and domestic support. The term domestic support subsidi s

as

avoided and members used "domestic support" because ' domestic support includes
"domestic support subsidies" as well as similar practices of support.
On the other hand, the definition of subsidies in Article 1 of the SCM includes
"budgetary outlays and revenue foregone," which is similar in nature to subsidies. The
fact that AMS (aggregate measurement of support), which is used for subsidies
calculations, is used for domestic support prompts the argument that domestic support
can be replaced with the term subsidies. Finally, the commitments on domestic support
are covered by commitments on subsidization. These are all reasons to identify the more
general term "domestic support" with the more specific "domestic support subsidies.
Food self-sufficiency has always been a primary goal of many countries state
policies. This issue becomes more important and, in some part more sensiti e
linking state food stability with national security issues. o country is
food imports. Moreover, when analyzing agricultural policies
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reduce or eliminate fluctuations in domestic farm prices and incomes. ,,54 But
the final
effect of agricultural support policies is that countries protect their own industry
from
natural market laws.
One of widely used agricultural support policy is market price support. The most
commonly used form of agricultural support, market price support, establishes the surplus
between a higher domestic price and a lower international price. Usually, the established
prices are fixed by government authorities. The over-estimated price leads to an
oversupply of agricultural products. Furthermore, the lower worldwide market price
stimulates imports and avoids importing countries' intensifying isolationist policies by
increasing higher tariffs, creating new barriers, etc. In other words, market price support
discourages market regulation and obliges a country to protect its own market, which is
unreasonable in a strictly economic sense and violates the main idea of free trade.
The other common form of agricultural support is deficiency payments. These
payments reimburse the difference between a previously fixed government price and the
lower real market price. In other words, in the first example the consumer subsidizes by
paying a high domestic price and here the government treasury pays the margin between
higher domestic price and lower market price.
As I previously mentioned, domestic support subsidies are divided in the same
colorization style set by the SCM. The main difference between export and domestic
subsidies is that domestic covers all: prohibited (Red), actionable (Amber) and non
actionable (Green) while exports are hugely concentrated in the prohibited, Red area.
Moreover, only import substitution subsidies are recognized as prohibited subsidies
54
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which shows the uncertain nature of domestic support in WTO legislation and the higher
level of sensitivity compared to export subsidies.
The SCM fully prohibits domestic subsidies as well as export sub idies. Article
3 .1 (b) of the SCM clearly states "subsidies contingent, whether solely or as on of

ral

other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. In other ord they are
intended to promote the use of locally produced goods over imported. For example in
Uzbekistan in 1995, farmers were ordered to buy locally produced Case harvesting
machines because there was a joint-venture between American and Uzbek companies to
produce those tractors and other agricultural equipment. Tariffs for other agricultural
equipment, except other imported "Case" agricultural equipment were artificially
increased by the government to avoid the competition with domestically produced Case
equipment.
Additionally, domestic subsidization can be recognized simply as infringing on
other countries' rights to import and compete, legally stated in the national treatment
clause of the WTO agreement. According to the national treatment principle the product
of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to the
like products of national origin in respect of all laws regulations distribution or us .

5

In Indonesia Automobiles56 Article III and the SCM were challenged on the ground that
the letter provides an exception for developing countries. The deci ion of the pan 1
based on the argument that Article III is more general than the
55

Article III.4 of the General Agreement.
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established the legal ground for additional, specific agreements like SCM, but there a
no interference between the two ruling documents because of their different co erage.
Article V of the SCM states that "no Member should cause through the u

of

any subsidy referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to the intere t
of other members." Meaning that this clause applies to any form of subsidy in any ector
of economy. This automatically includes agricultural subsidies within the scope of the
Article's regulation; otherwise there is no explicit exception in the Agreement on
Agriculture. Adverse effects, according to Article V of the SCM, include the follo ing
components: injury to the domestic industry of another member nullification or
impairment of benefits accruing to members in the sense of Article XXllI of GATT and
serious prejudice to the interests of another member. However, adverse effect a
expressed in Article V of the SCM does not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural
products as provided in Article XIII of the Agreement of Agriculture. Officially the
concept of adverse effect was excluded from the case. Regardless, by excluding tho e
effects, the WTO legislators did not exclude agriculture subsidies from the scope of the
SCM. This paradox seems, to me, to be an incomplete task where agreeing on sub idie
the countries are conscious about legalizing the effects of agriculture sub idie . Thi
problem, in Desta's opinion, "opens some leeway for 'blue box agricultural dome tic
support measures, which otherwise fully conform to other rele ant pro i ion to be
challenged under Articles V and VI of the SCM agreement.

57
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of the WTO. Furthermore, specific subsidies to aid research orga
nized by compani

or

universities, support disadvantaged regions in the framework of
regional de elopm nt
and to ease the adaptation to new environmental requirements are exem
pted a non
actionable. But they can still have a trade distorting effect, supporting and
protecting
farmers. All payments exempted by humanitarian reasonability to protect
the
environment, supply food to the poor, etc., are forms of masked protection

hich lead

perhaps not drastically but still inch by inch, to over production, surpluses and other
economic circumstances explained in the first chapter. Green subsidies are a unique
example where there is no special redirecting clause from the SCM agreement to the
Agreement on Agriculture concerning the agricultural domestic subsidies.
The difference between export and domestic subsidies is the legal existence of an
additional "blue" category of subsidies. Blue subsidies are efforts to limit agricultural
production by providing necessary support for local farmers in the form of
reimbursement for products that have not been produced, including appropriate income.
In other words, farmers are paid for not producing agricultural commoditie . It i mor
sensible to reduce the number of farmers, but countries maintain additional farmer a a
reserve for future black days to secure the internal food supply.
The main obligation of countries stated in Article 3 .2 of the
Agreement is to limit support in commitment levels noted in Section I of Part

gricultur
of th

Schedule. This means that even if domestic support subsidies are actionable or Amb r
they can be applied in amounts not exceeding the country s le el of commitment i .. th
amount of legal Amber subsidies. If there are no commitment rationall ther ar n
·
rights in the use of actionable subsidies to be shielded agam t po ibl hall nge .

To count the level of commitments and amount of allowed
ub idie

the

Agreement on Agriculture used the term AMS (Aggregate Measurement of
upport.
Annex 3 explai�s that "AMS is first and foremost the monetary expression of th

12

of

annual transfers made for the benefit of agricultural product."58 Those transfer can e i t
in two forms: general support, specially designed support for specific product producer
or non-specific support. The AMS calculation covers "price support,

hich is the gap

between "administered" price support and "fixed world reference price and non
exempted domestic subsidies.[cite] The nuance of the fixed world reference price i that
this price does not represent the real world market price, it is the average of the 1986-88
world market prices. 59
The Committee of Agriculture is responsible for monitoring the commitment
enforcement. All countries, according to Article XVIII of the Agreement of Agriculture
are required to provide notifications of domestic support activity sporadically. While the
country is not obliged to accept reduction commitments, its AMS cannot exceed the limit
level ( officially marked as de minimus level). 60 Additionally, countries are required to
submit a summary table (DS:1) and supporting tables (DS:1-9). 61 De eloping and lea t
developed countries can be exempted from submitting notifications but must till ubmit
tables.
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M.G. Desta, supra note 20, at 396.

t: Economics and Poli
see Harry de Gotter, Mer1·mda D. Ingco and Laura Ignacio, Domestic Suppor
an d
D e e1opmen \J orId B

Instruments. Agriculture and the WTO: Creating a Trading SyStem for
Oxford University Press 2004, p. 121.
60
de eloping ountrie · e
Not more than five percent than the value of production or ten percent for
supra, p. 122.
61

For details see M.G.Desta, supra note 20, at 423.

In case of introduction or further modification of existing support practice th
required notification must state compliance to the stated requirements in Article VI in
Annex 2. If the introduced or modified subsidy falls under an exemption or Green or
Blue categories, and development programs of developing countries, notification mu t
be submitted according to Article 18.3 of the Agreement.[Later, during the re 1 e
process the disagreement or possible complaints of another country about ne

or

modified subsidies can be raised with the Agriculture Committee.
In reality, the reduction commitment level is much higher and leaves a lot of
space for additional maneuvers. Most countries provide much less support than they are
bound to by the reduction level. As previously mentioned, because of the fixed

orld

reference price" problem 24 countries reached the 57% total AMS barrier at the
artificially established level. In 1995, when Blue subsidies were added to the AMS
calculation, countries still reached 73% of the overall level of commitments. 62
To summarize, there are some pro and con arguments. It was a successful effort to
create a regulative environment for the sensitive issue of domestic support of agriculture.
Domestic support, in my opinion, is a cornerstone of the Agriculture Agreement s
innovative model because domestic support subsidization is the main and mo t
favorable, instrument of implicit supportive action for protecting agricultural producer
Domestic support, for a long time was the foundation of agricultural protection polic
The Agreement, and the domestic support regulation specifically

er the fir t major

steps toward liberalizing agricultural trade.

62
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supra note 20 at
·
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But nothing is perfect, and still there are many problems that need attention.
There are a lot of legal ways to camouflage trade distorting subsidies in exempted green
and blue zones, and the amber zone is not quite restrictive in the limitation of dome ti
support subsidies. These problems leave a lot of unresolved issues for the future and
necessitate the continuation of negotiations on agriculture liberalization in the WTO.
It is well known that subsidies are widely used by developed countrie . The
reason is that developing countries cannot provide abundant financial support for
domestic agriculture producers, which creates an uncompetitive environment for
developing and least-developed countries. While the export of agriculture products is a
main source of income for many developing and least-developed countries developed
countries do not only rely on agriculture products, but export mainly industrial products
high-technology and services.
The developed world, in pursuing its own egoistic agriculture protectionism does
provide a chance for some countries to survive. Some small developing and least
developed countries cannot compete with developing, industrial "giants like China

ith

the cheapest labor force in the world, neither in production nor in attracting indu trial
production facilities to their countries. As a result, when agriculture producer recei e
huge, above-market price benefits for production, some developing countries are literally
stagnant because their agriculture products cannot find access to the agriculture marke
of the developed world.
to good from
In response, the developing world is trying to close its market
table for
developed world in order to save domestic industries. Isolationi m i not profi
·
th If de elop d oun
anyone; this
was proven by Davi·d Ricardo and Adam Smi

eliminate subsidization poverty in the developing world will be reduced becau e th
developing world can trade its agriculture products in the developed world. On the oth r
hand, the developing world will be able to consume more developed countrie produ

t .

Other problems like strengthening intellectual property protection in the de eloping
world can be solved with reciprocity to eliminate subsidies in agriculture.
In this chapter, my main goal was to analyze the regulatory mechani m of
developed countries and their approaches to the elimination of agriculture sub idie and
show tendencies among developed countries in that area. Next I will develop my own
proposals to further subsidy reforms in developed countries. I will focus on the US and
the EU' s experience with respect to the regulation and elimination of agriculture
subsidies. I choose these countries because they are key-players in the WTO which on
one hand promotes major reforms for agriculture trade liberalization while at the ame
time creating and experiencing the most severe, in terms of trade distortion agricultural
subsidization policies.

Chapter 3: The Practice of Applying Agricultural s ubs1·d·1es

m the Developed

World.

This chapter describes agricultural subsidization in the developed

orld. There

are two key players in the WTO, the US and the EU. At the same time, they are the mo t
addicted to subsidies - especially in the agricultural sector. This chapter consists of two
subchapters analyzing each country.

3.1) Agricultural Subsidization in the US

The case of the US is slightly easier to cover, as one country. While being one
nation, the US exceeds the union of 25 countries in agriculture production

hich

definitely shows the power of the US. While the US is the most innovative in agriculture
reforms, the model of colorization was first proposed by the US, it is also the first to be
heavily criticized.
I was really surprised that the US was one of the countries that supported the
63
initiative of developing the group of "like-minded" countries to reduce international

trade distorting subsidization. I understand why the US is willing to cancel ub idization
practices, because agriculture business in the US is concentrated in big agri ultural
corporations, in contrast with Europe, where small farmers are the main agri ultur
producers. Large American corporations are not as vulnerable to con equenc

of fr

igeria Cuba other fiican an� entral
"[I]ncluding India, Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and the w_TO: The nra �/mg of th
Policy
American countries." S ee James L. Kenworthy, US Trade
y Revie Journal pnng 20 0 p.
Seattle Conference and the future of the WTO. Georgetown Public Polic
6.
63
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trade as the small farmers in Europe. On the other hand, from the beginning urop n
agro producers are not profitable and cannot exist in a free market; this artificially t t _
grown phenomenon is a heavy burden on European consumers. This explain the hot
debates during the Uruguay Round between the US, accompanied by strong group of
developing countries, and the EU, Japan and South Korea. This
continues. There is a strong agro lobby pushing the American administration to increa
pressure on the EU to eliminate state support for agriculture producers.
The US, as well as the EU, is responsible for the majority of world trad
distorting subsidies, which is openly recognized by American authorities. E en

ith th

introduction of the Food Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, the Farm Bill
American expenditures on domestic support subsidies cannot exceed the le el of
domestic support AMS under the Agreement on Agriculture because there is mandatory
clause obliging the US to keep all expenses consistent with the US/WTO arrangement . 64
The US regulatory model of subsidization is primarily based on the Farm Bill
signed by George W. Bush in 2002. This statute establishes the mechani m for
subsidization and state support for agriculture producers and consists of the follo mg
titles:
•
•
•
•
•
•

65

Commodity Programs;
Conservation;
Agriculture Trade and Aid;
Nutrition Program;
Farm Credit;
Rural Development;

Rural In e tment
1 of The Farm Security and
See Title 3 Agriculture Trade and A'd
O
and
Bill
Farm
(FSRIA).
U.S.
' (c.)
tml
http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/tb2002/backgrounder.h
65
http://www.usda.go /farm bil
Official website of the US Department of Agriculture:
64

t of 00
bli ati

•
•
•
•

Research;
Forestry;
Energy; and
Miscellaneous Provisions.

It would be appropriate to look at the progressive development and transform
bill and note the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement. There

ation of thi
ere Farm

Bills in 1996, 2001 and 2002. The old bills proposed mid-term subsidies. The ne Farm
Bill requires regular consultations between the US Agriculture Administration and the
US Trade Representative to the WTO and the special committees of Congres on
Multilateral Negotiations at the World Trade Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development regarding agriculture export credit guarantee programs.
There are different approaches in farm domestic support subsidization mostly
used by the US, loan rate, target price, deficiency payments option and Blue
subsidization keeping farmers out of work. The loan rate or Export Credit Guarantee
Program, with an annual budget of $5.5 billion, guarantees loans to help farm ers during
harvest seasons. The loan is secured by a future amount of agricultural products and later
farmers have the choice to return the loan or exchange deposited products for the um of
loan, in other words, not return the loan and leave the products. In fa arable market
conditions it is more profitable to get back the agricultural products, sell them return the
loan and make a profit. But where the price of agriculture products has fallen the farmer
is secured by a minimum price which is established in the amount of the loan. It i lik a
As I already mentioned thi
1
fimancial air-cushion to insure the f:armers ' pos1·t·ons
insurance practice is recognized by the WTO but there is no clear legal r gim
established to prohibit (reduce) or allow this practice.

There was also an additional program created to reimburse the difference b
the targeted price and the real market price, especially when US farmers export produ t
worldwide. This Supplier Credit Guarantee program, an additional support mea ur
specifically designed for small to medium-size farmers. This program also timulat

th

participation of those farmers in other land conservation programs aimed at redu ing th
volume of land cultivated in the country, which definitely falls into the Blue category.
The major progressive change was the fixed level of support, using a targeted
price mechanism instead of a fluctuated market price. While fixing the market pri e
depends on fluctuations in the world price, the level, targeted price can be mor
effectively lowered. The farmers eligible for income support was limited to tho e v ho
sparingly used a federal program on various types of agricultural commodities.
The new Farm Bill created some programs to ease access to world agricultural
products and insure against the adverse effects of trade distorting subsidization practice .
One example is the Market Access program (MAP) which aids the expansion inter alia
of the US's agricultural exports. The funding level is not fixed. A second program
Export Enhancement Program (EEP), offers bonuses to improve competiti ene

and

relieve agricultural producers from the adverse effects of subsidization in other ords to
shield domestic producers from the discriminating subsidization of European comp ti tor
in the world agricultural market. The program is valid until 2007 and offer aid in th
amount of $478 million annually.
The other innovative program secures agricultural producer from
emerging countries. Valid until 2007, this program has solid fund.mg
.
. .
. ks of expand.mg the
direct subs1d1es
to cover the ns

port ri

to

ith l billi n in

us agn·cultural mark

t o

un

with emerging economies. Another program concerns the development of biotechnolog
in agriculture, which obviously falls under necessary scientific research exemption und r
the Green category. The last new program in the Farm Bill 2002 is desi gned to maintain
web resources for present or potential agricultural producers who wish to conquer other
countries' markets. These resources give necessary legal inform ation about the form of
support, obligations and other issues important to US agricultural exporters.
Specifically, in "Agriculture Trade and Aid" the Export Enhancement Program
for Agriculture Producers was designed as a protective mechanism against the unfair
trade practice of subsidization to protect the competitiveness of US agriculture products
on the world market, here "the definition of term 'unfair trade' expanded to include trade
distorting subsidies."66
These brief examples show the implementation process for agriculture reform
These reforms are made two ways, during trade negotiations in the WTO and in
Congress, which is responsible for supervising and authorizing any support for U
agriculture producers.
On the other hand, it is obvious that US agricultural policy is still far from
satisfactory. Increasing levels of domestic support subsidization make the situation
worse, resulting in increases of export output "more than 40 percent 67 of the four major
export commodities: com, wheat, soybeans and cotton. Most surprisingly the amount of

tur ·
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commodities harvested and income of farmers is decreasing.68 While the le el of upport
is increasing, the wave of complaints from other countries is rising. Countri

r

challenging the US government because heavy subsidization leads to surplu e being old
at prices lower than the cost of production, which is clear evidence for a dumping di put
in the WTO. Not to mention the injuries to developing countries, which I intend to fo u
on in the next part. The result of excessive subsidization is that farmers in the US and th
developing world are losing in a situation where both can win.
Based on the US report to the WTO in 2000-2001, Amber subsidies are graduall
decreasing. The level of support "declined by more than two billion dollars . . . 16.
billion in 2000, and $14.4 billion in 2001,"

69

which is consistent with 19.1 billion

commitment level for the same year. Not only is there some progress in decrea ing
domestic support subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture but also a fulfillment of
more than was obliged by the WTO treaty. The US is an example for other de eloped
countries like the EU and Japan. The most favorable sector for subsidies in 2001 v as
dairy - $4.48 billion, soybeans - $3.6 billion, and cotton - $2.8 billion. The

TO

established de minimus level mentioned previously is five percent of the total agri ultural
production subsidization allowed by the WTO, has shrunk to 6.83 percent.
eliminat
The US is well-known for using various agricultural aid programs to
firs
starvation in LDCs (least-developed countries) by donating tons of free food. The
reason why the US is active in this type of aid is to use its huge agricultural urpl

mr

n
effectively. On the one hand, this aid gives a Green, non-actionable reaso

tinu

68

See supra, the table on page 4.

69

See supra, No. 13, p. 519.

°

subsidization of domestic agricultural producers. On the other hand, it increa e the
humanitarian image of the US, which saves millions of people around the

orld from

starvation. But most importantly, this massive aid condemns poor people somewhere in
Africa to constant starvation and full dependency on US aid. American attempt to a e
people simply destroy agricultural production in LDCs. It is obvious that dome tic
agricultural production cannot survive after a huge donation, and falling price for
agricultural products in the markets of LDCs. More effective help, in my opinion

ould

be developing the domestic agricultural sector of those economies, not ' dumping free
food in the form of aid. Their development can flourish if appropriate access to US
agricultural market for their agricultural products is provided and discrimination in the
form of domestic support subsidies are avoided.

3.2) Agricultural Subsidization in the European Union

The European Union subsidization policy is a clear and famous example of ho
to be addicted to subsidies. The European Union in the past was one of the main
importers of agriculture products; today the European Union is a main exporter of
agriculture products, especially to former Soviet countries. But I cannot recognize the e
e the e
tremendous changes in agriculture production output as a victory becau
i that th
achievements cost billions of dollars every year. The strangeSt thing
boo ted b th
· ·
·
astomshmg influence of probab1 y t he strongest lobby in the world is
y the go ernm nt
government itself with artificial and unfair financial support. Logicall
es. Con equentl
is not usually involved in business activity, it only collects re enu

profitable, unsubsidized, successful industries need to pay higher ta

rat

for th

privilege of exporting more agriculture products, even if it will cost less to import th m
from third world countries. The other factor is consumers who are forced to pay mor for
fo od than people in countries where agriculture is less subsidized. Consumer

upport

poor farmers from bankruptcy, even though most are engaged in industries other than
agriculture.
There is also the non-economical, political argument that subsidies sa e farmer
from unemployment and supporting farm jobs are the basis for social security and
stability. This is why agriculture subsidies are a very sensitive issue, especially for the
EU, and the most controversial for more than half a century. This situation

ith EU

agriculture is the focus of my attention. I want to investigate the legal instruments of state
agriculture support in the EU. I also want to track the tendency for legal reform in
agriculture subsidization through the implementation of WTO requirements and official
EU reform proposals submitted to the WTO.
One legal problem is the "level where animus societatis is weaker

70

and

h

supervision organized by the EC commission and coherent interpretation of the rule b
the European Court of Court of Justice." 71 The other problem is that the intere
WTO are not focused on subsidies. The progressive development of the WTO

of th
tern 1 d

to displacement of the protection of tariff regulation by the stronger intere t of reating a
worldwide fair trade. This tendency defined the reason why subsidies ha e again fall n
into the scope of matters inside the WTO. It is also important that many ountrie in th
70
71

Pierre Didier "WTO Trade Instruments in EU Law", Cameron May Lond0n 1999 p. 209·
Id p. 209.

EU recognize subsidies as a governmental priority, shielded by nat·10na 1 sove

reignty and

they are not obliged to avoid them, regardless of their effects.
The next interesting problem is created by the long-standing debates bet een the
US and the EU, which highlight the different understandings of subsidies in Communi
Agriculture Policy. The difference between the understanding of subsidies and aid i
wide and covers many expenses of a business activity, which cannot exist or b gin
without outside help, but are similar to subsidies and have the same effect. This schola ti
definition of aid indicates the theoretical difference between subsidies and domestic aid
under European Law.
The Uruguay Round led to the discovery of the different American and European
conceptions of the proper role of the state in regulating business activities. The ECJ left
the right to support agriculture to achieve economic and social interests to the state. The
US view of subsidies does not disagree with this definition, but adds that the state mu t
follow the same rules as other business entities in the market. In other words

tate

support needs to be reasonable in the sense of economic profitability not in light of a
special state interest. Obviously, "state support policy" creates subsidies.
An important EU proposal during the Uruguay Round said that the di torting
effect of subsidies should be measured on a case by case basis because the situation ith
subsidies is often unique and cannot be purely categorized under a common colorization
system. The US rejected this proposal on the grounds that the case by ca e method and
n
the concept of "serious prejudice" would be too broad and argued the reasonabl
the subsidy's purpose should be tested according to its distorting effect on th

mark

of

The problem with reforming CAP was the structural hierarchy of the European
Community. On the one hand, was the different status of influence between the Coun il
of Ministers and the Agricultural Commission, on the other hand, was the po er in the
hands of the national governments. The other difference was the complexity of the
agricultural economy in Europe. In 1980 there were 6.5 million farms on 102 million
hectares and 8.7 million farmers in the EU while in the US there were just 2.6 million
farms on 430 million hectares and 3.5 million farmers, 72 which also explains the extra
flexibility for agricultural reforms in the US. With a larger percentage of fa rmers, Europe
was more constricted than the US; this is probably a reason for the continued resistance
to reducing domestic support subsidization. At the same time the EU is a major importer
of US food exports, which definitely gives more negotiating pressure power over the US.
The power of other countries inside the WTO, even all together, cannot outweigh the
EU' s unwillingness in WTO agricultural negotiations.
The EU, under pure market conditions, cannot survive as a major agricultural
exporting country. The EU has to increase investments in different types of industries
which are more effective and can easily flourish in the free market. When a le s
profitable sector of an economy overwhelms more profitable sectors huge sum ar
wasted for domestic agricultural support. At the same time, this support strongly affe ts
poor countries around the world. Nobody can win with agricultural subsidization and the
EU, under continuous press·tire of local agro-lobbies, is still reluctant to promot
necessary changes to eliminate export and domestic support subsidization.
n
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Chapter 4: The Practice of Applying Agricultural s ub s1·d·
1es m the Developing
World.
This chapter covers the developing world's subsidization
practices. The fir t
subchapter gives a general overview of subsidization in developing and
transitional
countries. Some of these countries have already J. oined the WTO, some are on the1r·

ay

to accession. The second subchapter gives an overview of the agricultural sector in
Uzbekistan. In this subchapter there are proposals for agricultural reforms in general and
specifically, how to reduce agricultural subsidization and domestic support.

4.1) Agricultural Subsidization in Countries with Developing or Transitional
Economies
This part intends to cover the issue of agricultural subsidization from the side of
the developing world. In developing countries, the agricultural sector of the economy wa
taxed rather than supported like the industrial sector. The problem was the orientation of
developing countries towards only industrial development. The lack of access to the
agricultural markets of the developed world forced developing countries to concentrate
production and trade on industrial goods. It is also important to note it was in the intere t
of the developed world to constrict fast growing industries of developing countrie
mainly because of cheaper labor forces and lower costs of production. By promoting
strict regulation of scientific patents, economically rich countries left only one
opportunity for developing countries: to be sources of either labor or natural resource
to dome tic farm r Opponen ts of this idea raise food security issues and threats
th e "holy," privileged parasites on state budgets. The food security is ue is ea il

oh d

with food banks and other insurance programs · There is no di"f1eren
:J:':
ce between dome h•
and foreign agricultural producers and either will secure the US food market.
Developing countries are the main agriculture exporters. The liberalization
of
trade in industrial goods creates unfairness: rich, developed73 countries become rich r
while developing countries, the majority, remain stagnant without any positive change in
export opportunities. Today, many countries' industries cannot effectively compete

ith

China's low manufacturing costs. Their sole chance for survival in the jungle of
capitalism is to gain access to the agriculture market of the developing world through the
same conditions found in the industrial goods market.
In 1997, the exports of developing countries accounted for 31.2 % while 3. 7% i
attributed to countries in transition.

74

Based on the changes in import levels and export

stagnation, I can assume agricultural subsidization policies blocked further development
of developing countries and progress in the agricultural exports of developed countrie
was quite apparent. For example, the level of agricultural export in the EU increased nine
billion dollars from 1990-93 while imports from developing countries remained at
approximately the same level during the same period. 75
The reluctance of key players like the EU to proceed with agricultural reform
f; ·

.

76
forced 13 developing and three developed countries to unite as the Cairns Group -- air-

m
traders at WTO agriculture negotiations. Together these countries ha e beco
Usually, the term developed means industrially develop ed.
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powerful group putting pressure on key WTO players WTO • Th'1s um
'fi1ca ti' on of mt
• r
can be a good example for countries in transition to concentrate therr· com
mon mter t
against the developed world.
The main scop e of this chapter is one group of developing
world countri
countries with transition and emerging economies. The CIS (Commonwealth of
Independent States) is a good example of countries with economies in transition. The
countries are different from other developing countries in many ways.
These transition countries previously had socialist economies where the com r
stone of a capitalist economy, private ownership of property, was prohibited. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, many post-socialist countries entered a phase of extreme
reform. For some former Soviet countries (most countries of the CIS) and East Europe it
was a turbulent, "shock-therapy" period. For others, like China and Uzbekistan there
were gradual step-by-step reforms. Most surprisingly, both scenarios worked well. East
European countries like Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics are members of the
OECD; China has been one of the most-successful at transforming from the old- tyle
socialist state into a modem, industrial tiger.
According to a World Bank report, some countries with transitional economie
have reintroduced direct and indirect support of agriculture which is especially i ibl
during 1996-97. 77 This happened because transition countries could not create enough
competition or an open environment for the agriculture market, which led to fi'
investments in the agricultural production of those countries.
Technical Pa r
. n Economies World Bank
. io
. Transit
. . s m
See Alberto Valdes, Agriculture Support: Policie
No.470, World Bank, Washington D.C. 2000.
77

In the CIS particularly, the most problematic
reform ·issue was the huge deb
t of
agriculture producers, which created new waves of domestic
support subsidie in the
form of debt forgiveness, direct credit transactions, price supp
ort practices etc. oft
budget constraints and states' unwillingness to force farm ers to return ere
d't1 s or pay taxe
led to a situation where farms, instead of being profitable, became a burd
en on national
budgets. "They [farmers] are able to continue borrowing from suppliers, from
the tate
and sometimes even from commercial banks, presumably because everybody _ the
borrowers and the lenders - believe that the government will not let the large farm
enterprises go bankrupt and will continue to arrange for periodic bailouts." 78
On the other hand, post-Soviet countries eliminated some forms of direct producer
support, including the most important - food price controls. This kind of support, in some
part, guaranteed farmers' profitability by excluding free market price risks. The major
obstacles became "poor infrastructure, incomplete privatization and land reform labor
market rigidities, weak contract enforcement, underdeveloped credit facilities, inefficient
marketing channels." 79 In other words, economic conditions are often inappropriate to
provide effective reforms in agricultural production and trade.
Agriculture has become a major part of state support in Russia and other countrie
in the CIS since the Soviet period. There are three types of state support for dome ti
agriculture. "Input cost subsidies for agriculture producers, procurement credits and
. .
.
subsidies and general agncultural
producer sub si·d·ies (including investment funds and
or Cas
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support for social infrastructure)." ° CIS countries struggled t0 fimd the ngh
• t solution to
promote effective agricultural reforms. Various subsidies were app1·1ed to save and
gentl

reintroduce agricultural businesses to new market condi·�ons
u
. These subs1·d·1e \ r
applied in the form of "price support and input subsidies, subsidized government credit
and commodity credit, debt-write-offs and barter transactions to settle claims financial
rehabilitation through farm reorganization." 81
The Soviet Union traditionally controlled the agriculture sector very tightly and
significantly supported its agriculture producers. The primary support mechanisms were
credits or direct payments for all expenses. The government also required selling all
agricultural goods at fixed state prices, much lower than the average world market price
Additionally, only governmental officials could sell agriculture products on the

orld

market. This situation led to artificially low prices in the domestic market which
sometimes created shortages of food and other agricultural products while surpluse of
exported of agro products created a dumping effect.
The CIS countries are actively moving towards WTO membership, and ha e a lot
of their own, interesting suggested agriculture reforms. At the same time the CI
countries are still heavily subsidizing their own agriculture. They need to promot
reform, not only to be consistent with present WTO restrictions on agricultural
ing
subsidization, but to keep in mind potential future progressive consequences of reduc
01her CI
an d fully eliminating all forms of trade distorting subsidies. Russia and
nity based on
countries, including Uzbekistan, do not have to re1Y on a "free ride" opportu
B
so
· Agricultural Refonns. \J orld
· Russian
· m
. ies
Douglas Galbi, The Significance of Credits and Subsid
Policy Research Working Paper. 1995 World Bank.
81 S
ee C. Csaki, Z.Lerman, S. Sotnikov, p. xiv.
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their "developing country" or LDC status. I do not believe any new candidate

ill b

accepted as a LDC; Kyrgyzstan was accepted as a developed country, despite being far
of

poorer than other developed countries. Further, with the fast growing economi

Russia and Kazakhstan, they can be promoted to the higher rank of countries like Korea
and the Czech Republic - members of OECD - soon after acceptance. The
implementation of new WTO standards in the undeveloped agricultural sector can create
stagnation and a total collapse of agriculture production in these countries becau e GDP
is boosted by high oil prices rather than real growth in industrial or agricultural
production. During the period of acceptance these countries must implement the ha ic
rules of the WTO which prohibit Red agriculture subsidies.
Based on the requirements of the Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement and
Subsidies Code, CIS countries need to develop their own scenarios for legal reform . It
will be very helpful for them to benefit from American and European experience

\J

ith

reforms to avoid the likelihood of future turbulence created by emerging liberalization of
the agriculture market. There is no need to create the bicycle again. The experience of
other countries, especially key members of the WTO, will be very useful.

6

4.2) Agricultural Subsidization in Uzbekistan: Proposal s fi
or Agn. cultural Reform
and Elimination of Subsidization

Agriculture is a cornerstone for further economic dev
elopment in Uzbeki tan.
Cotton exports account for "30-40% of total foreign exchange earnin ." 82
Uzbekistan i
gs
the " second large st exporter of cotton in the world and fifth largest supplier.

83

After a

slight decline, the level of output in agricultural production stabilized in 2000 and
reached the same level of production fixed in 1990. In 1995, agricultural GDP increa ed
by "2.2%, in 1997 by 5.8 %, in 1998 by 4.1%, in 1999 by 5.6 %, in 2000 by 3.4 % in
2001 by 4.2 %, in 2002 by 6.1 %." 84 Despite this increase, it is far from the rapid growth
of agricultural production in transitional Eastern and Central European countries. The
government of Uzbekistan, reluctant to promote fast reforms, still maintains control o er
production and technical assistance. Plus, the government regulates and fixes prices for
more than half of wheat and cotton sales. This fixed price is artificially reduced to ea e
access to agricultural commodities.
The government provides farmers with technical assistance and establishe a
purchase price, much lower than market value. Also a minimum amount of agricultural
production (about 60 percent) must be sold to official government enterprises and then
official government enter prises export commodities at market prices. As a result the
g of Wheat and Cotton in
. . ketin
.
See Gary Christensen, Deregulating Farm Management and State Mar
re and \ ater
Uzbekistan. April 2003, Joint-research by the World Bank and Mmisitry 0f Agricultu
Resources of Uzbekistan. April 2003, p. iii.
83
'•
. . informational
Commodities,
Spectrum
. .
. html
http·//
• www.spectrumcommod1t1es.comleducat10
· n/ commodity/statistics/cotton
84
ession into the WTO. (In
zn
. th e process of Acc
.
See Problems of Agricultural Sector of Uzbekistan
Russian), Anonymous source. p. 2.
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►
.
profitability of cotton production for farmers in Uzbekistan i· s 1ess than nee
or oth r
agricultural products, which are not as tightly controlled by the govemment. Wh'
. tle th
government is supporting farmers, it is also trying to control their income. Thi type of
regulation has Soviet heritage when farmers had artificially created "plans for minimum
levels of agricultural production. The main difference is that during the Soviet era the
government forced farmers to sell the entire amount of commodities produced and
currently farmers are obliged to sell only more than half of the amount produced.
One necessary reform is the liberalization of all agricultural producers, including
those producing wheat and cotton. The opportunity to sell directly, without government
intermediaries, will increase profitability. Government interference is not profitable for
farmers or the government. Most importantly, state-established prices and high ga oline
expenses have made it impossible for agricultural production to be profitable for farmer
There are three types of agricultural enterprises in Uzbekistan. The first i the
shirqat, collectively owned agriculture enterprises similar to Soviet kolhoz.

om

elements of the old-style enterprise remain, including production plans and state supplied
gasoline and tractors, etc. Each shirqat consists of smaller, family-based entities called
pudrats.
farmer. Farmers rent land
The second agricultural enterprise is the private
supervision. Fanner ha
formerly owned by kolhoz 's but is not under the Shirqat's
.
of the Shirqat In contra t to
production quotas, which are similar to the producti on Plans
internal economic and human
the large shirqat, a farmer enterprise has independent,
resources management.

>
Private land owners, dehqan, are the third type

0f

agn· cu1tural e nterpn e .

Individuals own small amounts of land and ownership can be transfierred to foll
owmg
generations. Dehqans are free from state control and supervision and the y m
· depende ntly
manage and control their business. Their main problems are a lack of infonnation and
access to telecommunications. This experimental enterprise has proven to be the most
e ffective.

Without state subsidies, dehqans produce more than 91 .1 % of m eat, 84.9% of

milk, 75.7% of fruit and 60% o f eggs produced in Uzbekistan.85
Based on the fact the smaller enterprises are more effective than larger on es, it is
reasonable to propose that dividing the large enterprises into smaller ones will increase
agricultural output. Moreover, it will improve the effectiveness of internal manag eme nt
in agricultural enterprises. The problem of choosing which commodity will be the most
profitable and appropriate to produce is easier to solve under the conditions of dehqa ns
rather

than in large, tightly controlled shirqats.
One official reform currently promoted by the government is transforming non

pro fitable shirqats to dehqans through bankruptcy pro cedures. According to civil law
officials must provide a last chance before declaring a large unprofitable e nterprise
bank rupt. The last chance "sanaciya" is a two-year period in which the government
establishes external management,

reduces

n o n-profitable expenditures and moSt

importantly, restructures debt obligations; in other words, debt-forgiveness.

A sa n a ciya i

pt shirqa t i
.
.
av ailable for a limited period of time. Afterward the propertY of the bankru
sold or divided into small dehqans.
Macro Economi
•
.
.
• •
2002'P . 106, Ministry of
See Statzstz
cal Collection of Uzbekistan zn Figures vol. 200l _
and Statistics of Uzbekistan' Tashkent 2002. p. 106.

85
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This is a specific aspect of Uzbek reforms which allows the
go

vernment to avoid

. nned1ary
ext reme and radical change. The large shirqats are preserved m
. fonn
· an mte
.
with slight changes moving from collective to private ownersh'p
1 and management. It 1s
understandable to gradually reform agricultural production to avoid the shocking affect
food supplies, but on the other hand, it merely postpones necessary refonns.
Conservatism in reforms is not good from a long-term perspective. Compared to other
countries with a more radical approach, Uzbekistan saw fewer declines in agricultural
production at the beginning of reforms. However, Uzbekistan lost more overall because it
did not fully benefit from liberalization the way other transitional countries benefited.
The lack of necessary reforms forced the government to increase agricultural
subsidies. Tax benefit

to farmers provide subsidies for fertilizer, gasoline and

mechanical equipment. The government also subsidizes farmers through low interest
loans and further debt-forgiveness. In 2000, debt-forgiveness totaled $167 million.
Considering the cost of living in Uzbekistan, with an average salary of $30 per month,
86
the debt-forgiveness looks like solid subsidization. The largest budget expenses are

water access subsidies. The government completely funds irrigation system expenses.
Most water used for agriculture in Uzbekistan requires costly pumping equipment.
producers in an
These subsidies are outweighed by hidden taxation of agricultural
rnment
amou nt of $120 million, or 8.7% of the GDP. 87 Most interestingly, the gove
.
.
ces and then
oblig ates farmers to sell commodities at pnces lower than rea1 market pri
ceedings the
taxes them, making them unprofitable. Subsequently, in bankruptcy pro
.
uFT1'o (In Rus ian)
o th e rr
. tan in
. process 01,r Accession Int
prob/ems of Agricultural Sector of Uzbekis
Anonymous source, p. 11.
87 "
·
Review
of social and structural policy" Tashkent 2 001
86

•
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p
government forgives all debts and gives the bankrupt farmers a chance to surv
ive. Also
government revenues and farmer incomes will increase · Agn·cultura1 producers
will be
more indep endent in their management and will be able to rely on theu. ow n profita . .
b1hty
and productivity, rather than subsidies or government support.
Uzbekistan was motivated by mercantilist 1·deas to pro
duce

In recent year

most

varieties of agricultur 1 production domestically in order to reduce its imports.
Uzbekistan experienc d th

ame losses as other countries. The idea of comparative

advantage proved th t it i more effective to specialize in the production of a specific
product and e port

r th r than produce everything without export potential.

Uzbekistan's r du ti n

f cotton production cost more than it gained from self

sufficiency in wh at. It

ill b more profitable for Uzbekistan to increase its export of

h t fr m Kazakhstan. In reality, the wheat and flour produced in

cotton and import

Uzbekistan doe not c mp r to the higher quality wheat and flour from Kazakhstan. At
the same tim

climatic

onditions make it more appropriate for Uzbekistan to

concentrate on cotton pr duction.
The governm nt till
vegetables yet at th

am tim

and
idely uses subsidies to support farmers exporting fruits
government
taxes the income highly. In my opinion, the

ect
should provide fa rmer a more effective insurance policy by avoiding direct and rndir
·
·
•
·
This will not only secure
sub s1·d·1 zation,
especially tho e distortmg mtemat10naI trade ·
farmers but will also be consistent with any WTO requirements.
make
There are major steps of reform the government sh ouId

First of all, it needs

products at world
to gi. ve full, direct and independent access to farmers wh 0 want to sell
.
as. The government
pnces. It should eliminate the state monopoly on se11·mg cotton overse
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should assist farmers by providing telecommunication 0r access to worl
d commod ity
exc hanges or organize its own commodity exchange w't
1 h c.
iree access to forei
gn

pu rchasers.

The governmen t should also abolish all hidden and 1·nd·1rect
tax burdens on
.
farmers while proportionally increasing direct taxation on risi·ng 1n· comes. Taxation
should be structured according to income level. This will force flourishing agricultural
enterprises to grow whil fi cally reducing less-profitable enterprises.
Next, the gov mm nt s import substitution policy delivers more loss than benefit.
It is better for farm r to concentrate on cotton production. Based on the theory of
comparative advantag

it i more profitable to import wheat and other food supplies

rather than trying to produc everything to the detriment of cotton production. This does
not mean that agricultural producers will be limited to cotton production. There are many
profitable agro product that can be exported to neighboring countries. Naturally, the
colder climates of Kazakh tan or Russia are better suited to plant wheat rather than fruits,
which require a dry desert climate. Most importantly, Uzbekistan is geographically close
to the growing industrial economies of Kazakhstan and Russia. In the case of fruit, it is
cheaper and faster to import it from Uzbekistan than from Israel or other middle-eastern
countries which have similar climates.
cover agricultural
Uzbekistan should provide efficient insurance to farmers to
.
su ccessful
nsks; a stab ilization or reserve fund could be establ.ished · When harvests are
.
.
ould use this
increa sed incomes from surplus could be applied to th'is fund Farmers c
resource in black days when harvests are not sufficient.
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C
The government should secure food supplie
s from Russ·ia or Kazakh
stan by
initiating a common agricultural market zone. It is obv
ious industrially they are
competitors of Uzbekistan. However, because of climate
differences a common
agricultural zone would be profitable. This step would be a first
for a regional custom
union like NAFTA or Mercosur. 88 It would force countries to spec
ialize in goods not
competing with goods produced in neighboring countries. For exam
ple, due to their
expensive labor-force, Kazakhstan or Russia would be interested in produ
cing products
which require a lot of investment but less labor. Uzbekistan, having the cheapest
labor
force, would be interested in more labor-intensive production.
Finally, the WTO is not a charity. Uzbekistan can effectively and fully benefit
from accession to the world free trade union when it has some preferences for a limited
number of countries. Today, outside the WTO, Uzbekistan is discriminated against by
WTO member-countries. When it is a part of the WTO, it will still be discriminated
against by regional unions like NAFTA. The government should be ready to face this
discrimination and find common trade interests with neighboring countries to unite into a
small regional union in order to protect their own "sweet" interests in regional
"sweetheart" deals.

On D�cember 16, 2003, certain members ofthe And e an C
nit (CAN) comprised ofVenezuela,
h
Co lomb ia, and Ecuador, and the members ofthe Common Ma
°i;:-�of�he South (MERCOSUR),ewhic
·
ent for
em
Agr
on
ntati
e
m
e
l
omp
C
me
.
onuc
· 1 udes Argen tin a, Brazil, Uruguay, and Pa�aguay, sig
ned an Econ
the formatio n of a Free Trade Area which will take effect on Ju 1Y 1 ' 2004 According to CRTA Annual
Re�ort, 2000 (WT/REG/9), WTO has been _in forme d ofthe _conclus . o o 220 RTA worldwide, amo ng
which over 100 agreements coverin g trade m goods or services, or �O�h h ve been notified to the WTO
.
' ti�fiied under GATT Article XXN,
smce 1995. Of the RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO , 121 agreem ents no
.
19 agreemen ts un der the En ablin g Clause and 12 under GATS Article V are still in force today. Other_
ciatIOn
sso
•
Free Trade Agreement' the A
notab le examples in clude the European U 10
n, the N 0.rth Amen. can
a- ew
?
.
Co-operation, and the Australi
ofSoutheast Asian
Nations the South Asian Asso ciation for R egional
Zealand Closer Econ omic Relations Agreement.
88

f
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•
Conclusion

Today is a crucial moment at the beginning in
the reco
11 rm of regu1 ano
· n and
enforcement of agricultural subsidies that distort trade. In the recent
past, the agricultural
sector was a tabo o for existing export subsidy regulation. At the end
of last year, the
"peace-clause," the legal "stronghold" against dispute settlement
challenges,
expired.[cite] There are new challenges for the dispute settlement body of
the WTO.
Panels have already identified various European and American subsidies of dairy
and
cotton as trade distorting. Even at the primary level, it is a major step to empower the
traditionally weak rules against export and domestic support subsidies.
On the other hand, shifts in the WTO view of distorting agricultural subsidization
1s most important for developing and transitional countries, because it opens new
horizons for further economic development. The developing world does not have to
continue to endure stagnation and incomplete development while countries inside the EU,
without perspective and enjoying favorable conditions for agricultural production, remain
major exporters of agricultural products. The inequality of opportunities for further
economic development between the developed and developing world can be lessened by
.
· market access to agricultural
re1corms m
markets and the redu ction and elimination of
trade-distorting subsidization of agricultural producers.
export
.
.
It is still early to be satisfied with this ach"1evement · The distorting effect of
. .
.
· developed countries to
subsidi
es is recognized, but there is a persistent lack Of WI·n 10
TO
promote further reforms in this area. Green subs.id.ies, which are allowed by the W

6

have a strong distorting e ffe ct economically. The reluctance 0
f the US to reconstruct
Gre en subsidies is unde rstandable be cause major subsidization er:i.-1
.
0 rts .c.
1a11s mt
o this area.

The Europe an Union's reluctance is another mai:i or
obstacI e .c.1or contmuous

reforms to eliminate subsidization. Shielded by national interests, the
EU is trying to
prevent the "de ath" of its farme rs, who are the strongest lobby in the
pro-socialist
oriente d governments of Europe an countries. To achieve political benefits,
the EU
definitely lose s from an economic point of view. It is unprofitable to continue supporting
something which cannot be profi table inste ad of increasing profits in profitable industries
and sectors of the economy.
The deve loping world is still he avily influenced by bilateral communications with
the develope d world. Not all developing and transitional countries in the WT0 are united
to prote ct their common interests and increase pressure on developed countries for
liberalization of international agricultural trade . Developing and transitional countries
are, for t he most part, competi tors for access to developed world markets, but this rivalry
should not be an obst acl e to achieving the ir common goals and interests inside the WTO.
Uzbe kis tan is a country waiting outside the WT0 "club." Access to this club
needs

to be me asured on a scal e of benefi ts and losses: what it will acquire because of

liberalization and ne w opportuniti e s for access to other markets. Rushing this issue can
throw

.
· Kyrgyzstan Countries
. h happened m
Uzbekistan into poverty and rece ss10
n , wh1c

.
with a GDP similar to o th e r LDCs have be en accepted wi'th the status of a developed
. the WT0 Uzbekistan needs to
. onment m
country. This shows the truly hostile envir

de
fullY use the abundant tra
mature economically, to be adult and strong enough to
.
. . .
influ ence of the US a
poss1b
1hties in the WTO. Another concern 1s that under the Pushy
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a major strategic partner in the war on terror, Uzbekistan will be rushed to join the WTO.
A lack of effective risk assessment would ruin even the minimal economic achievements
it ha s gained.
I hope that this research helps to understand the advantages and disadvantages for
agricultural export opportunities in the process of joining the WTO. It will be useful to
identify hidden agricultural trade subsidies and high-tariff barriers as the main
instruments of developed countries to support their own agricultural producers and
discriminate against others.
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